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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

NORMAN RILEY and ROBIN RILEY,
husband and wife,
Appellants/Plaintiffs,
v.
SPIRAL BUTTE DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
an Oregon Limited Liability Company;
JIM HORKLEY, an individual; and
JOHN DOES 1-V,
Respondents/Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-145

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho

in and for Madison County
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding

Michael J. Whyte, Esq.
Attorney for Appellants
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Ronald L. Swafford, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
Swafford Law Office
525 Ninth Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a complicated real property transaction between the parties that began
in October of 2001. Plaintiffs Riley had been involved in a complicated bankruptcy beginning in
2001. In an attempt to redeem real property sold during the bankruptcy, Riley borrowed money
from Defendants Jim Horkley (hereinafter "Horkley") and Spiral Butte Development, LLC
(hereinafter Spiral Butte). As part of the agreement for the loan of this money, Horkley and/or
Spiral Butte were deeded the real property and leased it back to Rileys. Contained within that
lease was an option allowing the Rileys to purchase the property back from Horkley and Spiral
Butte. Shortly after the parties reached this lease with an option to purchase, the parties agreed
that a third party would take over the lease of the property for the term. Prior to the end of the
lease term and in compliance with the option to purchase, Riley's notified Horkley and Spiral
Butte that they intended to purchase the property. This request was denied by Horkley and Spiral
Butte. Rileys filed their complaint on February 20, 2008 alleging breach of contract and
requesting specific performance. An amended complaint was filed on December 28, 2009. On
February 17, 2012 Horkley and Spiral Butte filed for summary judgment. This motion was
granted by the District Court on April 23, 2012. Rileys filed this appeal on May 31, 2012.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs Riley are farmers residing in Madison County. In 2001, the Rileys were forced
to file bankruptcy. As part of this bankruptcy Rileys' real property was sold, but Rileys retained
a right ofredemption for the real property. R. Vol. I, p. 167. Rileys' sought the assistance of
Horkley to redeem this real property. R. Vol. I, p. 168. In October 2022, Rileys and Horkley

1-

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

reached an agreement wherein Horkley' s money was used to redeem this property for Rileys.
Horkley at some point transferred the real property to Spiral Butte. On October 25, 2002,
Plaintiffs entered into a Lease Option Agreement with Spiral Butte. R. Vol. I, pp. 170-181; 183.
Contained within this Lease Option were the terms that Rileys would lease the property for five
years, and at the conclusion of this lease term they would have the opportunity to purchase the
property from Mr. Horkley and Spiral Butte Development, LLC. R. Vol. I, p. 177. Shortly after
the execution of the Lease Option Agreement, Rileys and Horkley agreed that a third party,
Howard Jensen and Mark Jensen would take over the farm operation of that property until
Plaintiffs were able to farm themselves. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184; 189. Section 9 of the Lease
Option Agreement allowed Rileys to assign this lease. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 172. Pursuant to
Section 9 of the Lease Option Agreement, and the agreement of the parties, Howard Jensen and
Mark Jensen farmed the property through the fall of 2007 R. Vol. I, p. 190.
At the conclusion of the lease term, Rileys advised Horkley and Spiral Butte that they
planned to purchase the property. R. Vol. I, p. 139. In response to this request, Horkley and
Spiral Butte took the position that Rileys were in default of the agreement. R. Vol. I, p. 141.
Rileys filed their lawsuit seeking specific performance of the contract on February 20,
2008. R. Vol. I. P. 5. Horkley and Spiral Butte filed an answer denying the claims contained in
the complaint. R. Vol. I, p. 31. An Amended Complaint was filed on December 28, 2009. On
April 23, 2012, the District Court granted Horkley and Spiral Butte's motion for summary
judgment. R. Vol. I, p. 223.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the plaintiffs/appellants raised material issues of fact with regard to the
alleged breach of the purchase option contained in the Lease Option Agreement;

2.

If there was a separate oral lease, whether the Court correctly determined that the
oral lease did not survive the Statute of Frauds;

3.

Whether the district court correctly concluded that there was an oral lease
agreement separate and apart from the Lease Option Agreement;

ARGUMENT
1.

SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE IN THAT THE
RlLEYS RAlSED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WITH REGARD TO
HORKLEY/SPIRAL BUTTE'S CLAIM THAT RILEYS BREACHED LEASE
OPTION AGREEMENT

The District Court in the underlying action granted summary judgment to Respondents
holding that there were no issues of material fact. When reviewing a ruling on a summary
judgment motion, the Appellate Court applies the same standard used by the district court.
Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.' I.R.C.P. 56(c ). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact is on the moving party. Van, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986."
citing Van v. Portneuf Med Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).
This Court will construe the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in
that party's favor. Id Summary judgment is improper 'ifreasonable persons
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could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented.' McPhetersv. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003).
However, a 'mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary
judgment.' Van, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986.
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 890 (2010)
The District Court granted summary judgment to Horkley and Spiral Butte Defendants
stating that Rileys did not raise material issues of fact because they did not show that they abided
by the terms of the Agreement. R. Vol. I, p. 233. Specifically, the District Court determined
that the Rileys never personally paid any rental payments, purchased any insurance, paid
electrical bills, maintain payments on the existing irrigation "circles" or paid taxes. R. Vol. I, p.
233. However, the District Court erred in its finding that there were no issues of material fact
that Rileys complied with the lease terms through the agreed to have Howard and Mark Jensen
take over the farming of the property. Horkley testified that the parties agreed the Jensens would
take over the farm operation until the Rileys were able to. This included payments. R. Vol. I,
pp. 169, 184, 189. Having the Jensens take over the farm operation was consistent with Section
9 of the Lease Option Agreement allowing the assignment of the lease terms. When Horkley
testified that Jensen would take over the farm operation until the Rileys were able to, Horkley
believed that Rileys were maintaining an interest in the property including the option to purchase
the property at the end of the lease term. The property was farmed for the entirety of the lease
period under this agreement. This creates a sufficient material issues of fact to survive summary
judgment.
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2.

THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING IHAT THE ORAL AGREEMENT
DID NOT SURVIVE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

The District Court held that the oral lease agreement was unenforceable because it
violated the State of Frauds. Under the Idaho Statute of Frauds, in order for a contract or
agreement involving the lease ofreal property for a term greater than one (1) year to be
enforceable, there must be some writing signed by the party against whom the agreement is
meant to be enforced. Idaho Code §§9-503 and 9-505. However, the Statute of Frauds does not
apply to an agreement that has been partially performed. Idaho Code §9-504. "So long as partial
performance has occurred under the contract, the trial court had the discretion to compel specific
performance, despite the lack of written evidence of the parties' agreement." Jolley v. Clay, 103
Idaho 171, 177, 646 P.2d 413, 419 (1982).
In granting summary judgment to Horkley and Spiral Butte, the District Court focused on

the oral agreement between Horkley and third party Jensens. The District held that the
agreement between Horkley and Jensens could not be enforceable against Horkley. However, the
focus should have been on the agreement between Rileys and Horkley. It is undisputed that
Rileys and Horkley had a written, enforceable lease agreement. When both parties became aware
that the Rileys would not be able to actually farm the property, instead of terminating the written
lease agreement, Horkley and Rileys entered into an oral agreement that Jensens would take over
the written lease until Rileys were able to begin farming. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184, 189. This oral
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agreement was either a separate oral agreement or an oral modification of the original written
lease agreement.
If it is viewed as a separate oral agreement, it is enforceable against Horkley because of
partial performance. As indicated in both Idaho Code §9-504 and Jolley, partial performance of
an oral contract pulls the oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds. Horkley and Riley orally
agreed to have Jensen farm the property until Rileys could get back on the property. Horkley and
Riley proceeded under that agreement with Jensen to complete the terms. This partial
performance survives the Statute of Frauds and it was error for the District Court to dismiss the
amended complaint on summary judgment.
If, on the other hand the oral agreement between Horkley and the Rileys is determined to
be an oral modification of the existing written lease agreement, it is still enforceable as against
Horkley. Parties to a contract can agree to modify the contract. A modification can be implied
by a course of conduct. "Consent to a modification of a prior written contract may be implied
from a course of conduct consistent with the asserted modification. Ore-Ida Potato Products,
Inc. v. Larsen, supra at 296, 362 P.2d 384. The question of whether an alleged oral modification
was proven by 'clear and convincing' evidence is one for the trier of the facts to decide in the
first instance." Resource Engineering Inc. v. Silver, 94 Idaho, 935, 938, 500 P.2d 836,(1972).
Horkley and the Rileys orally modified the written lease agreement when they met and decided to
have Jensen farm the property. After that oral agreement, Horkley and the Rileys proceeded with
the agreement. The parties, by their actions in having Jensens farm the property, orally modified
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the written lease agreement. By have the J ensens farm the property, by agreement, there was no
abandonment of the property to trigger a violation of the lease. The parties actions created
material issues of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.
3.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A.~
ORAL LEASE AGREEMENT SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE LEASE
OPTION AGREEMENT

The District Court held that summary judgment was warranted because there was a
separate oral lease agreement between Horkley and Jensens separate from the Lease Option
Agreement. The parties agree that shortly after the written Lease Option Agreement, that Jensen
would take over the farming of the property. The District Court determined that this was a
separate oral agreement from the agreements between Horkley and the Rileys that could not be
enforced against Horkley. The District Court erred in holding that this was a separate agreement
and that the Rileys could not validate that agreement. As outlined in the previous section, the
agreement between Horkley and the Rileys is the controlling agreement. When Horkley and the
Rileys orally decided that Jensen would farm the property it was a modification of the existing
written lease agreement. It is not the separate agreement between Jensen and Horkley that the
Rileys are seeking to enforce. It is the agreements between Horkley and the Rileys that are being
enforced. Horkley and the Rileys agreed to have Jensen farm the property until the Rileys were
in a position to take over. All parties agree this was the sequence of events, and the parties
proceeded under those events. Horkley and the Rileys were not relying on any agreement with
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Jensen before proceeding under the terms of the original written Lease Option Agreement.
Sufficient issues of material fact have been raised to survive summary judgment and it was error
for the District Court to tie enforcement on an separate agreement not between the parties at bar.

CONCLUSION
There remain genuine issues of material facts regarding completion of the lease terms
sufficient to withstand summary judgment and it was error for the District Court to dismiss the
amended complaint.
DATED this t i

day of October, 2012
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the l

~-day

of October, 2012, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be served upon the following persons
at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail
with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth
below.

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

RONALD L SWAFFORD ESQ
SWAFFORD LAW OFFICE
525 NINTH STREET
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

MJW:tlh
J:\data\MJW\6525\PLEADINGS\Appeal Breif.wpd
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